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CASENOTES
UNITED STATES v. PA YNER*
NEW LIMITATIONS ON THE COURT'S
SUPERVISORY POWER TO
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION

The exclusionary rule is a rule of evidence used by courts to
safeguard the right to be secure from unreasonable searches
and seizures' under the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution.2 As the name of the rule suggests, it is applied in
criminal cases to exclude from trial, evidence which has been obtained in an unlawful search and seizure.3 The main purpose of
* 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980)
1. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 489, 216 S.E.2d 586, 588 (1975) (the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth
amendment rights). See generally Grant, ConstitutionalBasis of the Rule
Forbiddingthe Use of Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 60 (1941).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures .. ").
3. The landmark case in the development of the exclusionary rule is
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, the Court excluded
private papers obtained in an illegal search and seizure conducted by federal officers. Subsequently, in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), the
exclusionary rule was expanded to prevent the admission of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure conducted by state and federal officials. In a case decided the same day, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
the Court excluded evidence from state court which had been obtained in
an unlawful search and seizure conducted by state officials. The holdings in
Wolf and Lustig created the "silver platter doctrine." See note 103 and accompanying text infra.
The "silver platter doctrine" was repudiated in Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960). In Elkins, the Court relied on its supervisory power to
abolish the "silver platter doctrine" by using the fourteenth amendment
due process clause to incorporate the basic protection of the fourth amendment. The Court took the final step in development of the exclusionary rule
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, the Court held that illegally

obtained evidence was inadmissible in state or federal court because admission of tainted evidence was violative of a person's due process right.
The development of the exclusionary rule, however, has not been without
its critics. See People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Justice, then Judge, Cardozo's oft quoted statement, "It]he criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered"). See also Gottlieb, Is the Exclusionary Rule an Albatross Around the Judicial Neck?, 67 Ky. L. REV. 100
(1979); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
Cm. L. REV. 665 (1970).
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the exclusionary rule, protection of criminal defendants' fourth
4
amendment rights, is supported by two underlying policies.
First, the exclusionary rule deters law enforcement officers from
conducting unconstitutional searches and seizures because exclusion of illegally seized evidence, often essential to the prosecution, usually leads to acquittal of the defendant. 5 Second, the
exclusionary rule is used by the court as a means of protecting
the integrity of the judicial process by suppressing tainted evidence, thereby preventing the court from becoming an accom6
plice to the illegal activities of the law enforcement agents.
The application of the exclusionary rule is limited to situations meeting three requirements. 7 First, the evidence must be
the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure. 8 Second,
the unconstitutional search and seizure must have been conducted by agents or officers of the government. 9 Finally, the evidence must have been seized from a party who has standing to
allege that his fourth amendment rights have been violated. 10
The courts have generally relied upon these requirements as the
basis for invoking the exclusionary rule," but in some cases
4. See generally Wilkey, Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JuD. 214 (1978) (contains a good analysis of the exclusionary
rule's validity as protecting fourth amendment rights).
5. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) ("The [exclusionaryI
rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way - by removing the incentive to disregard it.").
6. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) ("However much
in a particular case insistance upon such rules may appear as a technicality
that inures to the benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law
proves that tolerance of shortcut methods in law enforcement impairs its
enduring effectiveness."); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (exclusion of a coerced confession was required to avoid judicial sanctioning of
activity corrupting the trial).
7. See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1957) (discussing the rationale in support of the exclusionary rule and the limits upon its application).
8. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914) (illegally
obtained evidence is excluded not for the reason that police forced their
way into a person's home, but rather because the police violated that citizen's fourth amendment right to be secure, a right which is not forfeited
when a person becomes a defendant in a criminal trial).
9. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921) (the fourth
amendment protects citizens only against unlawful searches and seizures
made by government authorities).
10. See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (a person has
standing to invoke the exclusionary rule only when he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or object unlawfully seized).
11. Compare Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972) (petitioner
required to establish his standing to exclude evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search conducted by federal officers) with People v. Adams,
176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (1903), affd sub nom. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S.
585 (1904) (testimony of a private individual about facts observed during a
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they have used their supervisory power to bring about the result
2
effected by the exclusionary rule.'
Although no clear definition of the court's supervisory
power has been enunciated, 13 courts have generally relied on
the power as a method of maintaining and effectuating civilized
standards for the judiciary. 14 The evolution of the supervisory
power is not clear, though several theories have been posited as
to its origin. According to some commentators, the power is an
15
extension of the rulemaking activities of the English courts.
Others have asserted that courts have inherent supervisory
power under Article III of the United States Constitution. 6 The
practical purpose of the supervisory power has varied. For example, the United States Supreme Court has exercised the
power to impose rules of evidence 17 and procedure 18 on the
trespass was not excludable as violating defendant's fourth amendment
rights).
12. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948) (supervisory power was

exercised by the court to exclude evidence obtained through a forced confession and improper detainment of the defendant). See also Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (confession extracted from defendant accused of
rape who was not advised of his right to court appointed attorney was excluded pursuant to the supervisory power); Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957) (violation of a federal statute by not taking criminal defendant to magistrate immediately required the suppression of confession obtained during delay).
13. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 1290 (5th ed. 1979) ("Supervisory control:
Control exercised by the courts to compel inferior tribunals to act within
their jurisdiction, to prohibit them from acting outside their jurisdiction,
and to reverse their extrajurisdictional acts."); BALLANTINE'S LAw DIcTiONARY 1241 (3d ed. 1969): supervisory jurisdiction:
A kind of original jurisdiction frequently conferred upon appellate
courts, especially the highest court of the jurisdiction, in the nature of
superintending control over inferior courts, exercised sometimes by
making rules for inferior courts and enforcing those rules ....
The
control exercised in some jurisdictions by a court over executive or ad-

ministrative officers and boards who exercise judicial functions inci-

dentally.
14. E.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (supervisory

power exercised to govern administration of justice in federal courts). See
also Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARv. L. REV.

1656 (1963) (an analysis of the applications of the supervisory power).
15. See Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the FederalCourts,

53 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1053 (1965) (discusses the historical development of the
supervisory power).
16. See Comment, Judicially Required Rulemaking as Fourth Amendment Policy: An Applied Analysis of the Supervisory Power of Federal
Courts, 72 Nw. L. REV. 595, 615 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Judicially Re-

quired Rulemaking] (indicating the supervisory powers arise out of the
Court's Article H powers).
17. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (the Court exercised its
supervisory powers to order a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the
defendant's confession by a panel other than those who would determine

the defendant's guilt); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1957) (retrial
granted to a defendant through the exercise of the court's supervisory
power because a witness for the prosecution was discredited).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:569

lower courts. The Court has also invoked the supervisory power
19
to correct improper action taken by administrative agencies.
Traditionally, the supervisory power has been utilized in
three types of cases. 20 The first category illustrates the court's
effort to protect the integrity of the judiciary. 21 In these cases,
the supervisory power is exercised to improve the quality of the
judicial process or to maintain a high standard of respect for the
judicial system. 22 The second category consists of cases where
the supervisory power has been used to enforce federal regulations which have been violated by federal officers. 23 Exercise of
the supervisory power in these cases is not grounded on the concept of protecting judicial integrity, but rather focuses on deterring undesirable conduct of federal officers. 24 The last category
includes cases where a criminal defendant requests the suppression of evidence alleged to have been improperly obtained
by federal officers. 25 Thus far, the courts have been reluctant to
exclude improperly obtained evidence where the conduct of the
18. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (supervisory powers
used to govern grand jury proceeding); Thiel v. South Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217
(1946) (the supervisory powers were exercised to grant a new trial on the
basis that jury selection was improper in the prior trial).
19. E.g., Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276
(1966) (supervisory power used to impose upon the Immigration Service
the burden of proving by clear, unequivocable evidence, grounds for deporting the defendant).
20. See generally Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69

(The author lists three
CoLuM. L. REV. 181 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HillI
categories of cases where the supervisory power has been applied; (1) to
protect or improve the quality of the judicial system, (2) to address statutory violations raising judicial questions, and (3) to oversee conduct of officials which is wrongful according to the court). See also JudiciallyRequired
Rulemaking, supra note 16, at 617-22.

21. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959) (supervisory power exercised to order new trial because information publicized in
local papers was deemed to be prejudicial to defendant's case though jurors denied having been influenced by the stories); Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657 (1957) (the court allowed the defendant to examine pre-trial
reports of an informer to be used by the prosecution).
22. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) ('The injury is not
limited to the defendant - there is injury to the jury system, to the law as
an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.").
23. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (supervisory
power exercised by the Court to order a new trial where police violated FED.
R. CRIM. P. 5(a) requiring that an arrested person be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1939) (the Court held that disclosure of wiretap information by a witness
violated the federal wiretapping statute).
24. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (exclusion of evidence pursuant to the Court's supervisory power intended to deter fourth
amendment violations).
25. See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (supervisory power
used by the Court to suppress evidence seized under an invalid search war-
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law enforcement officers has not violated either a federal statute
26
or the Constitution.
In United States v. Payner,27 the Supreme Court considered
whether a court may exclude evidence unlawfully obtained from
a non-party to the action at bar.28 This deliberation involved
three major issues. The first was whether the defendant had
standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. 29 Second, whether the
due process clause of the fifth amendment mandated exclusion
of the evidence. 30 Finally, whether the Court's supervisory
power could be exercised to exclude the evidence where the defendant lacked standing to formally invoke the exclusionary
31
rule.
FACTS AND LOWER COURT HOLDINGS

The evidence in Payner was seized during an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigation. 32 The IRS engaged a private
investigator, Norman Casper, to obtain information concerning
33
the financial activities of American citizens in the Bahamas.
The defendant Payner, already under investigation for income
34
tax evasion, was one of the target individuals in this operation.
As part of his plan, Casper developed a friendship with Michael
rant); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (supervisory power exercised to exclude a coerced confession).
26. See Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928) (the supervisory
power is not applicable to exclude evidence obtained in a manner that technically does not violate a person's fourth amendment rights). See also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (pretrial identification procedures
were not violative of defendant's due process rights in light of surrounding
circumstances and thus did not merit suppression under the Court's supervisory powers); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (where wiretap
did not violate fourth amendment or federal statute, the Court refused to
apply its supervisory powers to exclude evidence obtained through use of
the wiretap).
27. 100 S.Ct. 2439 (1980).
28. Id. at 2444-45.
29. Id. at 2444.
30. Id. at 2447 n.9 (the defendant's lack of standing to allege that his
fourth amendment rights were violated prevents him from asserting that he
was denied due process).
31. Id. at 2446 (the supervisory power is not available as a method to
exclude evidence where the defendant did not suffer a violation of his constitutional rights).
32. Id. at 2443.
33. Id. An investigation into U.S. citizens' financial dealings outside the
United States was conducted by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This
operation was referred to as "Operation Tradewinds" and was headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida. Attention was focused on the Castle Bank,
Bahamas, based on information received by the IRS that a suspected narcotics dealer had an account in that bank.
34. Id. at 2444-45.
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Wolstencroft, Vice-President of the Castle Bank in the Bahamas.35 Casper introduced him to Sybil Kennedy, 36 a former employee of Casper.
While in Florida, Wolstencroft stayed at Kennedy's apartment.3 7 One evening while Wolstencroft and Kennedy were out,
Casper entered Kennedy's apartment and removed Wolstencroft's briefcase. 38 The briefcase was then taken to a nearby
home, opened, and the contents photographed. 39 The evidence
obtained in this manner lead to the discovery of a loan guarantee made by Payner. 4° This loan agreement was the principal
piece of evidence in the government's subsequent prosecution
41
of Payner for income tax evasion.
The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio found
that Payner lacked standing to assert a violation of his fourth
amendment rights, thereby precluding the court from applying
the exclusionary rule. 42 However, according to the court, admission of the illegally seized evidence violated Payner's fifth
amendment rights and thus was excluded.43 Pursuant to its supervisory power, the district court suppressed the evidence and
Payner was subsequently acquitted. 44 In a brief order, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's use of its supervisory powers. 45 Two years later, the United States Supreme
35. Id. at 2443.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.

39. Id. at 2442.
40. Id. The photographed documents disclosed a working relationship
between the Castle Bank, Bahamas and the Bank of Perrine, Florida. Subpoenas were issued to the Bank of Perrine which ultimately uncovered an
unreported loan agreement made by Payner to the Castle Bank as guarantee of a loan made to Conel Development, Inc.
41. Id.

/

42. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 126 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (defendant does not have a right to seek exclusion of evidence obtained in a
manner which violated another person's fourth amendment rights).
43. Id. at 133:
Such governmental conduct compels the conclusion that Jaffe and Casper transacted the "briefcase caper" with a purposeful, bad faith hostility toward the Fourth Amendment rights of Wolstencroft in order to
obtain evidence against persons like Payner. That outrageous behavior
on the part of the Government infringes Payner's Due Process rights,
and can only be deterred by granting Payner's motion to suppress.
44. Id. at 135 (because of the outrageous conduct of the government the
evidence so obtained was excluded under the Court's supervisory powers to
protect the integrity of the judicial system).
45. United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(the appellate court agreed with the district court's exclusion of the evidence pursuant to its supervisory powers, and found it unnecessary to
reach the constitutional questions involved).

19811

United States v. Payner

Court granted certiorari. 46
SUPREME COURT OPINION

The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Powell, reversed the holdings of the appellate and district courts.47 According to the Court, use of the supervisory
power to exclude evidence under the facts in Payner would contravene the standing requirements of the fourth and fifth
amendments. 48 The Court held that an exercise of the supervisory power to exclude evidence under these circumstances
would be a clear departure from precedent, 49 and would amount
to an unfettered discretion to oversee the activity of law enforce50
ment agencies.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger expressly affirmed the rationale posited by the majority.5 1 While refusing to
condone the illegal activity of the IRS, the Chief Justice nevertheless stated that exclusion of the evidence would amount to
supervision of the executive branch in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.5 2 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Blackmun joined in a dissenting opinion 53 and urged that the
majority had ignored the underlying purposes of the exclusionary rule and supervisory power in an effort to limit their legiti54
mate use.
46. United States v. Payner, 444 U.S. 822 (1979).
47. United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
48. Id. at 2446:
We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize a federal
court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it
was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court. Our
Fourth Amendment decisions... [do] not justify the exclusion of
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the victim of the
challenged practices.
49. Id. at 2446 n.7 ("This Court has never held, however, that the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evidence obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or rule.").
50. Id. at 2445. "In the Government's view, such an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal courts to exercise a standardless disWe agree with the
cretion in their application of the exclusionary rule ....
Government."
51. Id. at 2447 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
52. Id. at 2447. "[TI his court has no general supervisory authority over
[T]he Exclusionary Rule is inapoperations of the Executive Branch ....
plicable to a case of this kind, but that should not be read as condoning the
conduct of the IRS. .. ."
53. Id. at 2447 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
54. Id. at 2453. 'The Court's decision to engraft the standing limitations
of the Fourth Amendment onto the exercise of supervisory powers is puzzling not only because it runs contrary to the major purpose behind the
exercise of the supervisory powers . . . but also because it appears to
render the supervisory powers superfluous." See also id. at 2451 n.10.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:569

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court's refusal to allow the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence in United States v. Payner5 5 was
based on three major premises. The first factor in the Court's
holding involved the availability of the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained from a non-party to the action.5 6 The exclusionary rule can only be invoked once a
defendant has shown that his fourth amendment rights were violated.57 Payner failed to establish standing since he had no expectation of privacy in the evidence stolen from an agent of the
bank.5 8 Thus, the Court ruled that the exclusionary rule was unavailable.5 9 So holding, the Court then considered the possibilin
ity of excluding the evidence on fifth amendment grounds, or
60
powers.
supervisory
court's
the
to
pursuant
the alternative,
Fifth Amendment Due Process

The protection of defendants' fifth amendment rights has
long been recognized as a basis for excluding unlawfully obtained evidence. 61 Exclusion of such evidence prevents abuse of
55. 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2444 (1980) (exclusionary rule not applied unless defendant's own rights were violated by an unconstitutional search and

seizure).
56. Id. at 2444. The Court relied heavily on its decision in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1978), which held that a court could not exclude evidence unless the evidence was obtained in a search and seizure that
violated the defendant's own fourth amendment rights.
57. E.g., Zimmerman v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939) (right to complain of violation of fourth amendment rights is personal). Cf. Goldstein v.
United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942) (a person who is not the victim of an unconstitutional search and seizure cannot object to introduction in evidence
of what was seized). See generally Trager &Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the FourthAmendment, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 421 (1975).

58. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (depositer has

no privacy interest in his records of accounts within custody of a bank). Cf.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (protection of the fourth
amendment extends only to those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy).
59. United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2444 (1980).
60. Id. at 2444. The Court considered whether the supervisory power
was applicable as a means of excluding the evidence in Payner. The Court

further discussed the district court's decision that the fifth amendment
mandated exclusion of the evidence in Payner. Id. at 2446. The Court held
that neither ground was sufficient to merit suppression of the loan agreement.
61. Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (use at trial of a person's private papers which were illegally seized was held to compel a person to be a witness against himself in violation of the fifth amendment). But
cf. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (protection afforded by the
fifth amendment does not exclude, in all cases, evidence which directly proceeds from the defendant in criminal proceedings).
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the judicial process, and insures a fair trial62 which is the principal guarantee of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 63 Fifth amendment due process is a flexible and
sometimes elusive concept. 64 Protection from government action which is shocking to our sense of fair play and justice is the
central idea behind due process.

65

To determine whether the

government's conduct is violative of due process limitations, the
courts have developed a balancing test.66 This procedure requires that the court weigh society's interest in admitting all
probative evidence 67 against the right to a fair trial guaranteed
68
to all those accused of crimes.
62. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959), where the

Court excluded a coerced confession on the ground that it violated the defendant's right to due process and stated: "[I]n the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought
to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves." See also Olinstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher .... If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites
every man to be a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.").
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall be ...deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See, e.g., Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (The Constitution recognizes and prohibits the evils which occurred during the period of the Star Chamber and
the Inquisition).
64. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (the Court recognized that unlawful police conduct has evolved from brutal acts to subtle intrusions and
thus requires the use of a flexible standard in determining what evidence
should be excluded at trial); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)
(police officers forced defendant to have his stomach pumped to produce
evidence used at his trial on narcotics charges; held to violate the defendant's right to due process) ("Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of
conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought
about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice.' ").
65. See Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (due process has to
do with denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to our universal sense of
justice); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("It is the duty of the
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizens and against

any stealthy encroachments thereon"); 1 ANNALS

OF CONG.

(1789) (remarks

of James Madison) ("The Courts will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the legislature or Executive; they will be naturally lead to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated
for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights").
66. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-60 (1976). The Court developed a balancing test involving two factors to be weighed by the Court in
determining whether due process requires exclusion of evidence. This test
involves a judicial weighing of (1) the need to provide the jury with all the
probative evidence for effective enforcement of law, against (2) the need to
protect the right to due process of all individuals. See generally Note, ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure- Applicability of Exclusionary Rule to Intersovereign Civil Suits, 51 TuL. L. Rav. 717 (1977) (discussion of the Janis
balance of interests test).
67. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the cost to society of excluding
probative evidence in a criminal proceeding).
68. See note 66 supra.
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To succeed on a due process claim a defendant must prove
two facts. 69 First, he must show that a liberty or property interest was infringed by the government. Second, he must show
that the government's justification for such an invasion is at
70
least arguably unfounded. Under the balance of interests test,
the need to admit all probative evidence was subverted by the
Payner court's duty to impose constitutional restrictions on official misconduct which reflects a bad faith hostility toward personal freedoms. 7 1 According to the District Court in Payner,the
due process rights of the defendant were violated by the "shocking" conduct of the government in obtaining the evidence admitted at trial. 72 Therefore, the district court excluded the evidence
on the ground that it was acquired in an improper fashion, and
that its admission at trial would contravene Payner's right to
73
due process.
Despite a fully developed analysis in the district court opinion, the Supreme Court virtually ignored the due process issue
and summarily disposed of it in a footnote. 74 The focus of the
Court's attention dealt with the fact that Payner was not the victim of the search that rendered the evidence tainted. 75 The
Court stated that a defendant could only assert violations of his
own due process and could not allege governmental infringement of another's rights. 76 Since Payner was not the victim of
the unlawful search, the Court held that he lacked the requisite
69. Jacobsen v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928, 936 (9th Cir.

1977), affid in part, rev'd in part, 440

U.S. 391 (1979) (sets out prima facie

case which must be proved for a defendant to succeed on a due process

claim: "(1) that their liberty or property interests have been invaded by the
government without an opportunity to challenge that invasion, and (2) that
the purported justification for the invasion [by the government] is at least
plausibly disputable .... ").

70. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-60 (1976). See note 67 supra.
71. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 129 (N.D. Ohio 1977)
("[U] nder the Janis balance of interests test, society's interest in deterring
due process violations outweighs society's interest in allowing the fact

finder to view all relevant evidence only when an official's conduct demon-

strates a bad faith hostility to the strictures imposed on him by the Consti-

tution.").
72. Id. at 133.
73. Id. "The evidence against Payner, which is the fruit of the outrageously illegal seizure... must be suppressed under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ..."
74. See United States v. Payner, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2447 n.9 (1980).
75. The defendant lacked standing to assert a violation of his fourth or
fifth amendment rights because he was not the victim of the illegal search.
76. Id., citing Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion) (limitations of fifth amendment arise only after the government
has violated a protected right of the defendant).
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standing to allege a fifth amendment violation.7 7 The Supreme
Court's emphasis on the fact that Payner was not the victim of
the unconstitutional search is subject to question.
The Payner majority devoted their exclusive attention to
the illegal seizure perpetrated by the IRS, and failed to consider
the effects of admitting the tainted evidence at Payner's trial.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has strictly scrutinized those
official actions which may jeopardize a defendant's right to a fair
and constitutionally sound trial. 78 For example, the Court has
held that prejudicial remarks made by the judge or prosecutor
79
during trial may impinge on the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Under these circumstances, the due process violation arises
from the improper nature of the "evidence" and its impact on
the jury.8 0 The common denominator which underlies these
cases relates to the proposition that a criminal defendant should
not risk conviction on the basis of improper actions at trial. 8 1
77. United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2447 n.9 (1980).

78. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952), where the Court
stated:
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause "inescapably
imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole
course of the proceedings ... in order to ascertain whether they offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples ......

See generally McCormack, Purpose of Due Process: FairHearing a Vehicle
for JudicialReview?, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1257 (1974); Ratner, The Function of the
Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048 (1968). Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (pretrial publicity was so extensive and sensational
that it prevented defendant from receiving a fair trial); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965) (high degree of publicity given pretrial hearing held to
prejudice defendant's ability to receive a fair trial); United States v.
Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1977) (reading of unsworn testimony of defendant at trial which may have influenced jurors held to violate defendant's due process rights); United States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir.
1976) (jury falsely assured that witness was testifying of his own will, where
in fact the Government had attempted to coerce his testimony and thus violated the due process rights of the defendant); Joe v. United States, 510 F.2d
1038 (10th Cir. 1974) (failure to instruct jury of a lesser included offense
violated the defendant's right to a fair trial).
79. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (judge's act of singling out one of
defendant's witnesses and warning him of the severe consequences of perjury effectively drove the witness from the stand and deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
(prosecutor's remarks stating that the defendant's failure to testify indicated the truth of the charges against him deprived the defendant of a fair
trial).
80. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) ("No formal
offer of proof is made as in other situations; but the prosecutor's comment
and the Court's acquiessence are the equivalent of evidence and its acceptance.") The Court held "the fifth amendment, in its direct application to the
federal government, . . .forbids either comment by the prosecution on the
accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence

of guilt." Id.
81. Cf. Silverman v. United States, 556 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1977) (a person's
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Arguably, the Court's admission of illegally seized evidence is a
violation of the accused's right to a fair trial guaranteed by the
fifth amendment.
In Payner, the government conceded that the search and
seizure conducted by the IRS violated Wolstencroft's fourth
amendment rights. 82 The Court seems to imply, however, that
the evidence is somehow less tainted by the fact that it is admitted at the trial of a third party to the illegal search. Rather than
focus on the impropriety of admitting the evidence at trial, the
Court uses lack of standing as a means of avoiding the defendant's due process allegations. 83 It is the trial court's admission
of the unlawfully seized evidence, and not the illegal means of
84
obtaining it, that violates the defendant's right to a fair trial.
By failing to address the due process aspects of Payner, the
Supreme Court may have set the stage for important fifth
amendment litigation.
Exclusion of Evidence through the Supervisory Power
Although the Payner Court refused to exclude the illegally
85
obtained bank records on fourth or fifth amendment grounds,
it seized the opportunity to comment on the district court's use
of its supervisory powers. 86 The supervisory power is exercised
to promote the appearance of fair trial proceedings referred to
by the courts as "judicial integrity. ' 87 One method used by the
courts to protect judicial integrity is to exclude illegally obtained
right to due process is violated when convicted on the basis of evidence
known by the Government to be perjured). "We recognize the cardinal importance that no person should be convicted on the basis of perjury. We
wholeheartedly support the rule that it is a denial of the due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment for a person to be convicted on the basis of
testimony known to the Government to be perjurious." Id. at 659.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2445 (1980) ("No
Court should condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behaviour
of those who planned and executed this 'briefcase caper.' ").
83. Id. at 2453 n.15 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
84. E.g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (in testing whether
"due process of law is satisfied," concern is only with constitutional violations which have a prejudicial effect upon the guilt determining process at
the trial).
85. United States v. Payner, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2447 n.9 (1980). See note 59
supra.

86. Id. at 2446.
87. E.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 410 (1945) (admitting a coerced confession would corrupt the trial); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 347 (1943) (the courts are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts themselves become instruments of law enforcement); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (the
supervisory power was used to reverse a mail fraud case because of improper impanelling of jury) ("[t) he injury is not limited to the defendant there is injury to the jury system. ...""
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evidence pursuant to its supervisory power. 88 Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence prevents the court from becoming an accomplice to the illegal conduct of police officers.8 9 Thus far,
application of the supervisory power to exclude evidence has
been limited to situations where a constitutional violation has
occurred.9 0

A basic premise of the Payner holding is that no constitutional violation had occurred, thus rendering the supervisory
power inapplicable.9 1 The defendant lacked standing to assert
92
alleged violations of his fourth and fifth amendment rights
which meant that technically his constitutional rights were not
violated. Payner could not demand suppression of the evidence
since, under the Court's interpretation of prior decisions, he had
93
not established a violation of his own constitutional rights.
Payner thus requires that a defendant prove that his constitutional rights were violated by an unlawful search and seizure
before the court will apply its supervisory power to exclude allegedly tainted evidence. 4
88. See Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (supervisory

power used to exclude testimony of witness who was disqualified); Rea v.
United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956) (supervisory power used to suppress
evidence obtained in manner which violated the federal rules governing

searches and seizures).
89. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946). See also Hill,
supra note 20, at 194 (the author discusses the Court's use of the supervisory power to protect the quality and integrity of the judicial process).
90. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (the supervisory

power is not to be used to exclude identification made by photographs of
robbery suspects which were not violative of the defendant's rights); On
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (the supervisory power is not broad
enough to exclude evidence of incriminating statements made to narcotics
agent which were transmitted by radio );Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928) (the supervisory power is not applicable to exclude wiretap
evidence which was obtained without violating the law).
91. United States v. Payner, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2446 (1980) (interests of parties do not change when analyzed under the supervisory power rather than
the fourth amendment, and the supervisory power does not extend so far as
to protect the rights of one not before the court).
92. E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (depositor has no
privacy interest in his bank records or accounts, and seizure of these
records does not violate depositor's fourth amendment rights); California

Banker's Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
93. United States v. Payner, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2444 (1980) ("The foregoing

authorities establish... that the respondent lacks standing under the
Fourth Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized. .. ").
94. See United States v. Payner, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2446 (1980). The focus of
the Court's opinion and the cases cited for support center on the defendant's lack of standing. The logical inference drawn from the Court's opinion
is that had the defendant been able to show standing, the court could have
excluded the evidence under the supervisory power or the exclusionary
rule. The Court stated, "We conclude that the supervisory power does not
authorize a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the
ground that it was seized unlawfully from a party not before the court."
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The requirement that a defendant must prove that his rights
were violated effectively attaches a standing requirement to the
exercise of the court's supervisory powers. 95 Similarly, as the
Court pointed out, a defendant must show that his fourth or fifth
amendment rights were violated before the court can suppress
evidence through use of the exclusionary rule. 96 Thus, both the
supervisory power under Payner and the exclusionary rule require the showing of a violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights before they are applicable. 97 Consequently, the Court's
holding in Payner renders the supervisory power superfluous,
since it is inapplicable except under circumstances where the
98
exclusionary rule is already available.
The exclusionary rule functions primarily as a safeguard of
an accused's constitutional rights by excluding from trial, evidence which is obtained through an unlawful search of the defendant's premises. 99 By contrast, evidence obtained from a
"target person" not intended to be prosecuted is admissible at
the trial of another. 10 0 The introduction of that illegally seized
evidence is no less violative of the Constitution simply because
it was obtained from someone other than the actual party being
95. Id. at 2453 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ("In
order to establish that suppression of evidence under the supervisory
power would be proper, the Court would require Payner to establish a violation of his fourth or fifth amendment rights ...

").

See also note 54 and

accompanying text supra.
96. Id. at 2447. E.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (the
exclusionary rule is only available to persons whose privacy interests have
been invaded); Ravalette v. Smith, 300 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962) (a defendant
cannot vicariously assert the fourth amendment rights of others).
97. See United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2446 n.8 (1980).
98. Id. at 2453 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
99. See United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2453 (1980) (exclusionary rule is not available to a defendant when the defendant was not the
victim of the illegal search and seizure). Cf. Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223 (1973) (exclusionary rule not available to a defendant whose fourth
amendment rights were not violated); On Lee v. United States 343 U.S. 747
(1952) (information voluntarily given to an undercover agent which was
transmitted by radio and later proved to be incriminating was not excludable under the supervisory powers).
100. United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980). Under Payner, the
supervisory power is likewise not available to those defendants who are not
victims of illegal searches and seizures. Thus, the evidence illegally obtained from a third party to be used against a defendant will be admitted at
trial. The district court and dissenting Supreme Court justices were concerned about this unavailability of a remedy because the IRS testified that
this is the type of conduct used by them to obtain information in similar
situations. See also Thibodeau, Supreme Court in Payner Admits Stolen
Third PartyEvidence in Tax Prosecution,53 J. TAx. 152, 154 (1980) (the au-

thor expresses concern for the effect of the decision in Payner, allowing
evidence taken illegally from third parties to be used at the trial of another).
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prosecuted. 0 1 Therefore, refusing to exclude evidence based
upon such a distinction is logically inconsistent.
A similar inconsistency, the "silver platter doctrine," existed during the development of the exclusionary rule. 0 2 Under
the silver platter doctrine, evidence obtained through an illegal
search conducted by state officers could be given to federal officers and admitted in federal court.'0 3 In 1960, the Supreme
Court upheld the use of the supervisory powers in order to correct the inequities of the silver platter doctrine. l °4 In Payner,
the Court passed on the opportunity to alleviate similar harshness and inequity by failing to recognize the full scope of the
judiciary's supervisory power.
IMPLICATIONS

The practical effect of Payner is that evidence obtained in

an unlawful search of a "target" person is not excluded from the
criminal trial of another person. 05 While there are several rem101. Compare United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980) (evidence

though obtained illegally is admissible at the trial of the defendant when
the victim of the illegal search and seizure was a person other than the defendant) with Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975) (the exclusionary
rule is applied to suppress any tainted evidence obtained in unlawful
searches). See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting), where the Court noted:
If the officers raid a home, an office, or stop and search an automobile
but find nothing incriminating, this invasion of the personal liberty of
the innocent too often finds no practical redress....
Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against
those who frequently are guilty. [emphasis added].
102. The silver platter doctrine was created through technical interpretations in two cases involving evidence illegally seized by state officers. In
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), the Court held that evidence obtained by state officers was inadmissible in federal court because federal
officers aided in the unconstitutional search and seizure. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), decided the same day as Lustig, the Court held that
evidence seized in an unlawful search conducted by state officials alone
was admissible in state court. See Note, 35 CORNELL LQ. 625 (1950) (the
author asserts that the majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, is an example
of the inconsistencies in the application of the exclusionary rule).
103. Compare Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) (evidence seized
illegally by state officers without the aid of federal officers and then turned
over to federal officers is admissible in federal court) with Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (evidence illegally seized by federal officers is
inadmissible in federal court).
104. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (application of the supervisory power to exclude evidence illegally obtained by state or federal officers from federal courts). See also Eichner, The "Silver Platter" - No
Longer Used For Serving Evidence in FederalCourts, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 311
(1960).
105. "Target person" connotes an individual selected by the Government
in the hopes that evidence can be seized from this source to be used in
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edies available to redress the victim of the unconstitutional
search and seizure, 10 6 none of these are an effective deterrent to
prevent similar conduct in the future. 0 7 Not only is there no
effective deterrent under these circumstances, but the mere fact
that evidence can be obtained from target persons without
threat of exclusion is an incentive for police officers to engage in
"target shopping."' 0 8 Under Payner, police can avoid having illegally seized evidence excluded by careful selection of search
victims-target shopping. This entails selecting a person not intended to be prosecuted, but who may possess evidence which
can be used in the prosecution of some other person. By acquiring evidence in this manner rather than directly from the intended defendant the police encounter less risk of having the
evidence excluded at trial. Thus, the decision in Payner encourages law enforcement officials to aim warrantless searches and
seizures at target persons rather than intended defendants.
SUGGESTED REMEDIES

The abuse which was engendered through expansive use of
the silver platter doctrine has been corrected by the courts
the prosecution of another individual. See J. Thibodeau, Supreme Court in
PaynerAdmits Stolen Third PartyEvidence in Tax Prosecution,53 TAX. 152,

153 (1980).
106. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(allowing. claims against federal officers for damages suffered pursuant to
an unconstitutional search and seizure). See generally Note, Constitutional
Law

-

Damagesfor Fourth Amendment Violations by FederalAgents, 21

1135 (1972) (discussion of remedies available for violation
of fourth amendment rights which include: (1) criminal prosecution of officers, (2) injunctive relief, (3) exclusion of evidence, and (4) damages);
DE PAUL L. REV.

Note, Actionable Wrongs - FourthAmendment Held to be Basis of Cause of
Actionfor DamagesAgainst FederalOfficersfor Illegal Search and Seizure,
3 Loy. U. L. J. 202 (1972).

107. Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). (If evidence is
not excluded there is no deterrent to such conduct in the future.) But cf.
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 283 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(excluding tainted evidence actually has no deterrent effect and creates "bizarre" results and thus should be used only in a small and limited category
of cases).
108. See United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2447, 2448 (1980) (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackrnun, JJ., dissenting) ("[The] holding effectively
turns the standing rules created by this Court for assertions of Fourth
Amendment violations into a sword to be used by the Government to permit it deliberately to invade one person's Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain evidence against another person."). See also Thibodeau,
Supreme Court in PaynerAdmits Stolen Third Party Evidence in Tax Prosecution, 53 J. TAX. 152, 154 (1980)
How can it [the IRS] be expected to comply and put up with the delay
and burden incident tothe legal niceties and formalities of third party
summonses and subpoenas when illegality will achieve the same en
sooner, with less hassle, and with the Supreme Court's blessing?
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through use of the supervisory power 0 9 Clearly, the decision in
Payner is likely to produce an abuse similar to that under the
silver platter doctrine. 110 Accordingly, future unlawful searches
and seizures of target victims can be deterred by excluding evidence so obtained pursuant to the court's supervisory powers."'
In Payner, the Court refused to exclude the evidence, holding that application of the supervisory power where there had
been no constitutional violation would be tantamount to an unfettered power over the executive branch." 2 Assuming arguendo, that the Court is correct, this discretion to supervise the
executive branch of government could be effectively controlled
if application of the supervisory power were limited by judicial
standards. These standards would comprise a threshold test
which would allow a court to exclude evidence where, as in
Payner, police conduct is grossly improper. Limiting the court's
use of the supervisory power in this manner prevents a breach
of the separation of powers since exclusion would not be available in all cases. Use of the supervisory power under this limitation would effectively protect the defendant's right to a fair trial
and serve to bolster the appearance of judicial integrity as well.
A threshold test for application of the supervisory power
should consider both the need to protect all citizens' constitutional rights, and the benefit to society of admitting all probative
evidence at criminal trials."l 3 One factor which could be
109. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (supervisory power
used to cure the inconsistencies of the silver platter doctrine; Court held
that evidence illegally obtained, whether by state or federal officers, was
inadmissible in federal court). See also Fichner, The "Silver Platter" - No
Longer Used For Serving Evidence in FederalCourts, 13 U. FLA. L.REv. 311
(1960).
110. Under the silver platter doctrine, evidence was admissible in federal
court if obtained through illegal conduct of state officers, but not admissible
if it was obtained by federal officers. Under Payner,evidence is admissible
in federal court when illegally obtained from a third party not intended to
be prosecuted. But evidence obtained in the same manner is excludable if
obtained from the defendant in a subsequent criminal prosecution. In both
instances technical distinctions are drawn which disregard the fact that the
evidence in either instance is obtained by illegal conduct.
111. United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2454 (1980) (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ('That appropriate case has arrived,
and the Court should prevent the Government from profiting by use in the
federal courts of evidence deliberately obtained by illegal actions taken in
bad-faith hostility to constitutional rights.").
112. United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980) (refusing to exercise
supervisory power to exclude evidence obtained from a third party not
before the Court). See also Chief Justice Burger's concurrence: "Orderly
government under our system of separate powers calls for internal self-restraint and discipline in each Branch; this court has no general supervisory
authority over operations of the Executive Branch. .. ." Id. at 2447.

113. See United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 135 (N.D. Ohio 1977)
(applying the balance of interests test formulated by the Court in United
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weighed by the court is the degree of hostility exhibited by the
conduct of the police officers. 114 The court might use this factor
to limit exclusion of evidence under the supervisory power to
extraordinary instances. This factor also insures that the courts
will exclude evidence in situations where it will be most effective as a deterrent. Thus, good faith action taken by police officers will not invoke the supervisory power.
A second element of the test to be considered by the court
involves a judicial determination of the necessity of surreptitious conduct by the police officers to obtain valuable evidence." 5 The necessity of improper police activity might be
measured in terms of the potential burden on effective law enforcement if police were required to obtain the evidence in another manner. The court should consider the type of evidence
involved, how easily it could be legally obtained, and the exigency of the situation. This second element of the test would
limit exclusion to instances where the police wrongfully failed to
obtain a search warrant or subpoena.
A final consideration which the court should review is the
nature of the crime involved." 6 The court should consider the
propriety of convicting a person accused of crimes especially
harmful to society. This element of the test relates closely to the
second element concerning the exigency of the situation. In
considering the nature of the crime involved the court must
weigh the strength of the public's interest in removing this type
of criminal from society.
States v. Janis, to determine whether illegally obtained information should

be excluded). See also Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 221 (1969) (courts
must consider society's interest in the effective prosecution of criminals);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (courts must provide an effective
sanction for violations of constitutional rights).
114. Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974), where in a case involving the inadvertent violation of defendant's Miranda rights, the Court
stated: "The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent,
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right .... Where the
official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force."
115. Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (The court must
consider the nature of the documents seized to determine if there was a
legitimate expectation of privacy violated by their seizure. The courts also
must recognize that some types of evidence have a high degree of useful-

ness in criminal prosecutions). There must be a balancing of protection of
citizen's rights against the legitimate needs of police in their attempts to

enforce the law.

116. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1968) (courts in applying the bal-

ance of interests test should consider the officer's interest in crime prevention, and the safety of the public at large).
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This proposed test requires that the court consider three elements before excluding evidence pursuant to its supervisory
power. These three elements briefly stated are: (1) the degree
of bad faith conduct by the police, (2) the availability of less offensive means of obtaining the needed evidence, and (3) the nature of the crime involved. These elements are drafted to allow
the court to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, while abating the fears of the Payner Court that standardless application of the power would amount to a breach of the
separation of powers.
When the test is applied to the circumstances in Payner, exclusion of the evidence would have been proper. The first element of the test supports exclusion because of the hostility of
the IRS to Payner's and Wolstencroft's constitutional rights.
The second factor also favors exclusion since the situation was
not the type where police would require exceptional speed to
prevent possible destruction of the evidence. The evidence
could have been easily obtained by search warrant or subpoena.
In light of the slight harm caused society by tax evasion, the last
element would also favor exclusion of the tainted evidence.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Payner engaged in a feat of judicial
sleight of hand. While the Court reprimanded the IRS for conducting a grossly illegal search and seizure, by denying exclusion of the tainted evidence the Court granted the Government
carte blanche to engage in future similar unreasonable searches.
The cursory manner in which the Court held that Payner lacked
standing to allege a violation of his due process rights creates
the possibility of much future litigation on the issue. The
Court's holding on the issue of the supervisory power rendered
it synonymous with the exclusionary rule, and is certain to raise
questions in future cases.
Rather than continue to apply an archaic standing requirement which focuses on the Government's illegal conduct prior to
trial, the Court should focus its attention on the use of the fruits
of that illegal conduct at trial. Exclusion of evidence illegally
seized from a third party effectively protects defendant's due
process rights and prevents the Government from using the
standing requirement to prejudice defendants. Where technical
interpretations of the fourth and fifth amendments prevent the
Court from excluding evidence on those grounds, the Court
should still exclude the evidence pursuant to its supervisory
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power. Application of a tripartite threshold test limits the
court's use of the supervisory power to situations where it will
be most effective as a deterrent, while least intrusive upon the
activity of the executive branch.
Michael A. Schoening

